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A G-2 For G-2

The United States suddenly has intelligence agencies running out of its ears.

There is the Central Intelligence Agency, which collects the raw information and feeds it to the appropriate agencies of government.

There is the board headed by Gen. Maxwell Taylor, appointed just last week to do intelligence on intelligence.

And there is now activated a presidential board to watch over all intelligence activities.

This proliferation, except for the CIA, is directly attributable to the Cuban blunder. Gen. Taylor's mission is to find out what went wrong, specifically whether faulty intelligence by the CIA prompted the abortive Cuban "invasion." His group will be disbanded once the questions are answered.

The presidential board, however, is to be permanent. It was created by President Eisenhower, but only now has come to life—it, too, hastened by Cuba. Its membership is of a high caliber, including the chairman, Dr. James R. Killian of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and such members as Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, former Defense Secretary Robert A. Lovett and former Governor of Virginia Colgate W. Darden.

As long ago as 1955, the Hoover Government Reorganization Committee suggested that Congress exercise a more direct control over the CIA, perhaps by creating a joint committee similar to that which oversees atomic energy. Others have felt the job could be done by the executive branch—and this, apparently, is the course which most appealed to Eisenhower and Kennedy.

One aspect of the Cuban failure was its underscoring the singular autonomy of the CIA—an agency so secret that its affairs have been only superficially screened by Congress. It is said in awe that the CIA chief, Allen Dulles, is the one man in Washington who can write a check for \$1,000,000 without making an accounting.

Some other questions may be resolved by the reexamination of U.S. intelligence activities. For example, does the CIA confine itself to collecting information or does it, contrary to sound intelligence work, also exert an influence on forming policy?

The CIA, as its leadership insists, may not have been responsible for sending the Cuban exiles into premature and disastrous battle, but there obviously was faulty knowledge of the invasion's chances.

If the current reappraisals show what went wrong and result in all intelligence agencies being brought under more purposeful control, Cuba may yet prove to have been a useful if costly episode.